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While social protection programs have multiplied over the last two decades across sub-Saharan 
Africa, these co-exist alongside humanitarian assistance in many places, calling for better 
integration of assistance delivered through the two channels. Progress on this front is hampered by 
limited evidence of whether and how these historically siloed sectors can work together. Using 
quantitative and qualitative data from districts covered by Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net 
Program (PSNP) and where humanitarian food assistance (HFA) was delivered, we assess 
differences in targeting and transfer values. We find that PSNP and HFA were targeted to 
households with different characteristics. PSNP transfers did, on average, reach those households 
that were chronically food insecure. HFA, while delivered through PSNP systems, was targeted to 
households that were acutely vulnerable. These are promising findings as they suggest that social 
protection systems are able to effectively deliver a continuum of support in response to different 
types of vulnerability and risk. On transfer values, we find that the value of PSNP transfers is 
greater than those for HFA. One reason for this may be due to social pressure on local officials to 
distribute support more widely across a drought-affected population when faced with acute needs.  





In the past 15 years, social protection policies and programs have become firmly established 
across sub-Saharan Africa as an important route to protection against food insecurity, to 
prevention of extreme poverty, and for the promotion of productive livelihoods for vulnerable and 
poor households (Beegle et al. 2018). In 2016, Cirillo and Tebaldi (2016) mapped and profiled 127 
non-contributory social protection programs from 39 African countries, with many more programs 
initiated since then (World Bank 2018). Yet despite the proliferation of these programs, ad hoc 
humanitarian assistance remains widespread. For example, of the 32 sub-Saharan African 
countries that the World Bank (2018) lists as having social protection programs, 13 received 
emergency assistance from the World Food Programme between 2018 and 2020. 
There are several reasons why amalgams of social protection interventions and emergency 
assistance continue to co-exist in the same African countries. First, the coverage and payment 
levels of many of these social protection interventions is low with the median social protection 
spending being around one percent of gross domestic product (World Bank 2018). Thus, the reach 
of social protection programs is still limited, with under-coverage a problem in many places (ILO 
2021).  
Related, a second reason is that, while levels of humanitarian need have continued to rise over 
the past decade with a concomitant increase in humanitarian financing, growth of official 
development assistance (ODA) to the least developed countries has slowed. Social spending in 
sectors key for strengthening human capital – including social protection, but also health and 
education – are decreasing as a share of total ODA (Caio et al. 2018), while levels of humanitarian 
financing – though growing – are relatively static in relation to need.  
Third, most social protection systems have been designed primarily for people and households 
with identifiable, often long-term, needs, such as insufficient food, assets, and housing, those who 
have been in poverty for long periods, and individuals who are identified as particularly vulnerable 
to poverty or destitution, such as the elderly or people with severe disabilities. Eligibility criteria 
based on identifiable need or vulnerability-markers is the cornerstone of targeting within social 
protection programs (Coady et al. 2004). But when shocks and disasters – especially those that 
are unanticipated – lead to sudden spikes in the number of people in need, it historically has been 
the remit and expertise of the humanitarian sector to react and ensure rapid provision to all those 
adversely affected by the shock. This siloing of responsibilities is inefficient and problematic in a 
world where the linkages between chronic poverty and the impacts of shocks are increasingly 
inextricable (Clarke and Dercon 2016). The necessity of social protection systems to flex and scale 
to meet acute poverty associated with shocks and stresses has become painfully apparent within 
the current context of COVID-19, where we see a highly uneven, and often highly inadequate, 
global social protection response to the impacts of the disease outbreak on employment, health, 
incomes, and food security (Gentilini et al. 2020).  
All this has led to calls for better integrating social assistance delivered through humanitarian 
channels and through social protection – in effect, a ‘continuum of response’ agenda. However, 
integration into a systemwide approach also comes with its own distinct policy and programming 
challenges and solutions (Cherrier 2014, Ulrichs and Sabates-Wheeler 2018). For example, unified 
social registries are useful to obtain rich social economic and demographic data on the poorest 
population cohort (World Bank 2015), but the information is expensive to update, so it risks quickly 
becoming obsolete for addressing certain shocks. Harmonising targeting can also be a challenge, 




Further hampering efforts at integration is a dearth of evidence of whether and how these 
historically siloed sectors work together. This paper seeks to contribute to redressing this evidence 
gap. Our study is situated in Ethiopia, a country well suited for consideration of these issues. 
Starting in 2017, the Government of Ethiopia committed itself to a reform of its existing rural social 
protection (the Productive Safety Net Programme, PSNP) and emergency food assistance 
operations (called Humanitarian Food Assistance, HFA) with a view to consolidating delivery 
systems and procedures into a single framework led by the Government. This framework supports 
the provision of predictable transfers to core PSNP clients while allowing the scaling up of support 
in times of shock through a harmonized set of procedures and the use of a common set of 
institutional arrangements. This required that stakeholders move towards: (i) strengthening the 
linkage between PSNP and HFA; and, (ii) supporting the application of a common set of 
operational procedures to the provision of PSNP transfers and to transfers to non PSNP 
households in response to drought.  
Using mixed methods, we consider three entry points for systems strengthening along the social 
protection delivery chain – administrative coordination, targeting, and payments (Seyfert et al. 
2019). We give particular analytical attention to: i) learning about the effectiveness of an integrated 
system when targeting households affected by different stresses and shock, i.e., with different 
characteristics; and ii) understanding whether transfer value equivalence across the humanitarian 
and social protection caseloads is an important factor when designing harmonized systems. By 
drawing on evidence from Ethiopia obtained in 2017 and 2018, when the system supporting the 
PSNP was used to deliver humanitarian support in an aftermath of a severe widespread drought 
that occurred in 2015/16, we provide new insights into the opportunities and challenges arising 
from integrating humanitarian assistance with social protection. 
2. CONTEXT 
Ethiopia has a long history of devastating droughts that have led to famines or more localized 
increases in food shortages (Webb and von Braun 1994, De Waal 2017). Major famines leading to 
hundreds of thousands of deaths occurred in 1974 and 1984, and throughout the 1990s there were 
recurrent requests for emergency food aid to address localized food shortages. Emergency 
assistance following a major drought in 2002 narrowly averted another mass famine, but, by that 
time, it was clear that more sustainable types of responses were needed. Beginning in 2005, the 
Government, together with a consortium of international donors, began implementing a new 
response to chronic food insecurity in rural Ethiopia. PSNP was established with the aim of 
replacing annual ad hoc emergency requests. Unlike annual emergency appeals, PSNP was 
conceived as a multi-year program to provide recipients with predictable and reliable transfers. The 
ambition was to improve food security and to prevent asset depletion at the household level, and 
through public works, to create assets at the community level. Between 2006 and 2014, food 
security improved among households that took part in the public works component of PSNP, and 
about 80 percent of this improvement can be attributed to the program (Berhane et al. 2016b).1 
PSNP currently operates in more than 300 chronically food insecure woredas (districts)2 with about 
eight million beneficiaries. 
 
1 There is also evidence that since its launch in 2006, the PSNP has increased tree cover in the highland woredas in which it operates in 
(Hirvonen et al. 2021). 
2 Administratively, Ethiopia is divided into regions, zones, woredas, and kebeles, with region being the highest administrative unit and 
kebele the lowest.  
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Yet, despite the successes of PSNP, the need for HFA has persisted.3 It is estimated that in 
non-drought years, approximately five million Ethiopians – not included in PSNP – need 
emergency assistance (NDRMC 2018). In the period covered by this study (2015-2018), poor 
rainfall during the main cropping seasons (the short rains, belg, and the long rains, meher) in 2015 
led to the worst drought in decades, resulting in an additional 10.2 million people (additional to 
those covered by PSNP) requiring food assistance (NDRMC 2017). While the rains in 2016 were 
better, the 2017 agricultural year was characterized by below average and erratic belg rains, 
conflicts in Oromia and Somali regions, and localized weather shocks in the south, meant that 9.35 
million people needed food assistance, including 850,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) from 
conflicts at the borders of Somali and Oromia regions (NDRMC 2018). 
PSNP woredas can apply for additional contingency funds to respond to a broad range of 
shocks and stressors to protect PSNP investments and support the livelihoods of program 
beneficiaries. Contingency planning is a design feature that has been embedded in PSNP from the 
program’s outset (Wiseman et al. 2010). In order to help avoid short-term household food needs 
turning into chronic food insecurity, the fourth phase of PSNP (2015-2020) included two design 
features: a woreda contingency budget and a federal contingency budget. The contingency budget 
is calculated as 16 percent of the base transfer budget: 11 percent is held at the federal level, while 
5 percent is managed by woredas.4 Under PSNP rules, contingency funds were meant for two 
uses: (1) to cover the needs of existing beneficiaries who require additional ‘top-up’ transfers for a 
period of time in order to maintain their food consumption and protect their productive assets 
during a shock; and (2) covering non-beneficiaries in PSNP woredas who require support on a 
temporary basis until the shock passes. Scaling up involves the PSNP temporarily reaching more 
beneficiaries for the duration of the shock and then scaling down again when the shock has 
passed. The two contingency budgets were meant to enable the PSNP to provide an early 
response before the full effects of the emerging shock are felt, so that people do not have to resort 
to harmful coping mechanisms, such as selling assets. But, the program is only able to expand up 
to the level of available resources in the woreda and federal contingency budgets. Any transitory 
needs that exceed these additional sources of funds are covered through the national emergency 
response system – typically through HFA. The geographical overlap between PSNP and HFA is 
considerable. In 2018, more than 90 percent of PSNP woredas were also receiving HFA (Figure 
2.1), suggesting that the number of people in need in these localities exceeds the PSNP caseload.  
PSNP uses a mix of geographic and community-based targeting to identify chronically food 
insecure households in chronically food insecure woredas. Initially, data on past receipt of food aid 
were used to determine the number of eligible beneficiaries in each region and woreda (Wiseman 
et al. 2010). Woreda administrators then selected chronically food insecure kebeles, assigning the 
woreda’s ‘PSNP quota’ among these areas. Within program kebeles, community-based targeting is 
used to identify eligible households, which are then assigned to public works or direct support 
(GFDRE 2006). The community-based targeting is based on common program criteria, including 
household’s chronic food security status, recent shocks, household assets (particularly livestock), 
non-farm income, specific vulnerabilities (such as female-headed households or those with 
 
3 "HFA is defined as direct transfers to individuals or households for the purpose of increasing the quantity and/or quality of food 
consumption in anticipation of, during, and in the aftermath of a humanitarian crisis. As such, it includes both in-kind food aid and cash 
transfers for smoothing consumption" (World Bank 2017). 
4 Historically, the contingency budget is calculated as 20 percent of the base transfer budget: 15 percent was held at the regional level, 
while 5 percent was managed by woredas. In 2017, the Government took steps to consolidate PSNP and HFA systems into a single 
delivery framework, since both aim to address transitory need; indeed, the PSNP midline performance report in 2018 revealed a level of 
confusion in woredas about the difference between them. The federal contingency budget line would no longer be pre-financed (the 
11 percent) but adjusted to zero. Finance would be mobilised from both the Government and development partners and held in a 
dedicated local currency account. Funds would be released based on predicted needs established through the biannual seasonal 
assessments and allocated to either PSNP or non-PSNP woredas. The woreda contingency budget remained unchanged: pre-financed 
at 5 percent and transferred in regular disbursements to the woreda. 
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chronically ill or elderly members), as well as the needs of poor and vulnerable pregnant and 
lactating women.  
Figure 2.1: Humanitarian Food Assistance (HFA) and Productive Safety Net Programme 
(PSNP) woredas as of January 2018 
 
Source: ENCU and the World Bank. The white area to the northwest is Lake Tana. 
Household re-targeting in PSNP is conducted every two to three years, with minor adjustments 
taking place annually. PSNP transfers are in the form of cash or food and in most woredas their 
distribution is managed by the Government of Ethiopia. PSNP beneficiary households receive 
transfers in return for participating in public works over a six-month period during a slack season 
when agricultural activities are not taking place. Food insecure households with limited labour 
capacity are exempt from public works and receive direct support. Food payments are supposed to 
consist of 3 kilograms of cereals (usually in the form of wheat) and 0.8 kg of pulses for each day 
worked (GFDRE 2014). Cash payments are calculated based on the cost of buying 3 kg of cereal 
and 0.8 kg of pulses per day. The wage rate is adjusted annually to take account of changes in 
grain prices. However, the relatively high food inflation in Ethiopia often quickly erodes the real 
value of cash payments (Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux 2010, Hirvonen and Hoddinott 2021). 
Each household is entitled to five days of payments per person, to a maximum (the ‘household 
cap’) of five persons or 25 days of payments. Thus, for households with 5 or fewer members, the 
per person per month PSNP transfer is equal to 15 kg of cereals and 4 kg of pulses. However, 
during the period of this study, pulses were included in the payment package sporadically, and it 
was later announced that pulses would be abandoned as part of the transfer altogether due to 
funding constraints (World Bank 2017). 
The geographical allocation of HFA is guided by a semi-annual classification of woredas 
according to their food security status. This “hotspot classification” is based on a multi-sectoral set 
of indicators that include nutrition, agriculture, market, water and hygiene, health, and education. 
Food insecure woredas are scaled from priority 1 to 3, with priority 1 woredas categorized as being 
most in need of assistance. In the period covered by this study, out of the 396 woredas classified 
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as priority 1, 2, or 3 in July 2016, only four percent (17 woredas) graduated out of HFA by January 
2018.5 In woredas selected to receive HFA, kebele officials select households eligible for support. 
Interestingly, while PSNP has elaborate and specific targeting guidelines, there is no stated target 
group or guidelines outlining eligibility for HFA.  
Household targeting for HFA is typically conducted twice a year after the seasonal assessments 
of the humanitarian situation. Unlike PSNP, HFA transfers are mainly in the form of food and are 
directed by the National Disaster Risk Management Commission (NDRMC) and the World Food 
Programme (WFP), with a consortium of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) helping to 
deliver. HFA households receive transfers over periods of 3 to 12 months, depending on the 
results of needs assessment and the availability of resources. About 90 percent of HFA transfers 
are made in the form of food. The per person per month HFA transfers equal to 15 kg of cereals, 
1.5 kg of pulses, and 0.45 litres of cooking oil (World Bank 2017). These are unconditional 
transfers, although households may be encouraged to participate in PSNP public works if they 
exist in their locality. 
3. DATA 
We use quantitative and qualitative data collected in 2018 (roughly covering the period 2017-18) 
from woredas benefitting both from PSNP and HFA. These data were collected as a part of the 
midline evaluation of the fourth phase of PSNP (PSNP-4) led by the International Food Policy 
Research Institute (IFPRI) and the Institute of Development Studies (IDS). The scope of the 2018 
evaluation was widened to assess the performance of HFA. To this end, the qualitative survey 
instruments included detailed questions about the interaction between the PSNP and HFA 
programs in woredas in which both programs were operational. Meanwhile, the quantitative survey 
was expanded to cover more households in woredas in which HFA was operational. The analysis 
reported here is based on data collected in woredas that were selected to benefit from both PSNP 
and HFA programs in six regions of Ethiopia (Afar, Amhara, Oromia, Somali, SNNP6, and Tigray).7  
3.1. Quantitative data 
The quantitative surveys informing the PSNP-4 midline evaluation were administered in June and 
July 2018, and data were collected at the woreda, community, and household levels. The sample 
consisted of 112 woredas where the PSNP was operational, and under these woredas, 336 
kebeles (or enumeration areas; EAs), and 10,022 households were visited.  
The sampling frame for the PSNP-4 evaluation focused on PSNP households and on poor non-
PSNP households, which served as a control group in the evaluation. These comparison 
households were selected based on their subjective welfare status. During listing, we asked all 
households to place themselves on a conceptual poverty ladder that had 7 rungs. The first rung 
represented the very poorest households in the village, while the highest (7th) rung represented the 
very richest households in the village. Households for the comparison sample were chosen from 
among those that placed themselves on the bottom four rungs.8  
This sample design is well suited for the impact evaluation of PSNP-4, but it limits our ability to 
study the targeting of the HFA as the richer strata in these communities are missing from the 
sample. We addressed this limitation by drawing an additional sample of relatively richer 
 
5 Based on authors' calculation using the administrative data received from the Emergency Nutrition Coordination Unit (ENCU). 
6 SNNP refers to the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' region 
7 The 2018 quantitative survey also covered a small number of non-PSNP woredas that received HFA. However, given the focus on the 
interaction between PSNP and HFA, the data from the non-PSNP woredas are not used in this paper. 
8 Our analysis of the 2016 baseline data suggests – as does our previous work in Ethiopia – that this poverty ladder is well correlated 
with other (more objective) welfare measures: durable asset levels, livestock holdings, and self-reported food security. 
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households (i.e., those in the top three rungs of the subjective poverty ladder) in 56 randomly 
selected woredas. These were selected from a sub-sample of woredas included in the PSNP 
evaluation and selected to receive HFA in 2018. Out of the list of 112 PSNP woredas that were 
part of the main evaluation study that met these criteria, we randomly selected 56 woredas from 
which to select the supplemental sample of richer households. The additional survey of these 
households took place at the same time as the main PSNP-4 evaluation surveys and was 
administered in the same kebeles and enumeration areas that were selected for the PSNP 
evaluation in that woreda. Three households in each enumeration area were added to supplement 
the original sample.9 The final additional sample is formed of 496 (relatively) richer households 
from 166 kebeles in 56 woredas. Here, we restrict our quantitative analyses to these 56 woredas 
and 166 kebeles. The household sample in these woredas is formed of 5,006 households, out of 
which 4,510 originate from the sample used in the PSNP-4 evaluation and 496 relative richer 
households from the additional sample collected specifically for the HFA performance assessment. 
Our targeting analysis uses sampling weights to correct for the unequal share of relatively 
poorer and richer households in the sample. From the PSNP evaluation sample, we have 30 
households from the lower rungs of the subjective poverty ladder in each kebele, while the 
additional survey provides us three households from the top rungs. Based on our household listing 
data, these original 30 households drawn from each kebele represent 88.8 percent of the 
population in the sampled areas, while the three households that located themselves in the top 
three rungs represent 11.2 percent of the total population (Annex Table 1). This means that we 
slightly oversampled households who located themselves in the bottom rungs and slightly under-
sampled households in the higher rungs. We use a sampling weight in our quantitative analyses to 
correct for this.10  
Analysis of payments is based on households’ reports about the payments they had received in 
the period between June 2017 and May 2018. For each month, respondents were asked the type 
of payment they received (cash, cereals, pulses, or oils) and the amount they received. Pooling 
data from the PSNP evaluation sample and the additional HFA sample, we have 2,803 households 
reporting PSNP or HFA payments over 13,125 household-payment months. About half of these 
payments were made in food and half in cash. To ensure comparability between cash and food 
payments, we converted all food payments into Ethiopian birr. To do so, we first converted food 
payments reported in local quantity units into kg amounts and then valued these kg amounts using 
price data collected from local food markets in June 2018. With food payments expressed in June 
2018 prices, we adjust all cash payments made prior to June 2018 by computing region-specific 
monthly cereal price indices using the monthly cereal price data collected at the kebele level. The 
consumption shares used in this index were computed from the 2016 nationally and regionally 
representative Ethiopian Socio-Economic Survey (ESS).11 After applying the price index on cash 
payments, all payments – irrespective of the payment modality or payment month – were 
expressed in June 2018 prices. 
3.2. Qualitative data 
A suite of qualitative survey methods complemented the quantitative methods, most notably focus 
groups and key informant interviews. Doing so provided a richer pool of data, particularly with 
respect to program implementation and beneficiary experiences. Key informant interviews were 
 
9 The questionnaire administered to these additional households focused on basic demographic information of the household, its asset 
levels, and the amount of HFA they received. 
10 The sampling weight obtains a value 0.98 if the household belongs to the lower four rungs of the poverty ladder. For the relatively 
richer households, the sampling weight is 1.23. 




carried out at regional, woreda, and kebele levels with government officials responsible for 
implementing the PSNP and coordination with HFA. Focus groups were held at the community 
level. These included groups made up, respectively, of men and women, the elderly and the 
young, and different types of program beneficiaries as well as non-beneficiaries.  
4. COORDINATION PROCESSES 
Administrative coordination across operational systems and processes for long-term social 
assistance and short-term humanitarian response is critical to ensuring a ‘continuum of support’ 
that is functional. Qualitative fieldwork at the regional, woreda, and kebele levels explored the 
degree of coordination and level of joined-up planning that exists between PSNP and HFA. A 
fundamental point is that PSNP operates according to five-year plans. These specify the program’s 
coverage, budget, and implementation guidance over a five-year period, or ‘phase’. Regional and 
woreda Food Security Task Force (FSTF) officials pointed out that there is no mechanism to adapt 
PSNP plans on an annual basis and, thus, that PSNP plans are not adjusted to either an increase 
in levels of humanitarian need or to the inflow of humanitarian aid.  
No, we did not change the PSNP plan. Because PSNP and HFA are different things, 
[each] have their own guidelines and mechanism to operationalize it. [TIG-RFSTF] 
No, the region has never changed plans to respond to humanitarian situations as 
regards to budget, public works, targeting, complaints, and grievance mechanism. 
[AMH-RFSTF] 
One exception to this, where officials exercise some flexibility, is in the implementation of public 
works. While not uniform, officials in some regions and woredas explained that they followed 
federal guidance in canceling public works requirements on beneficiaries during droughts. For 
instance, in Afar the region moved to unconditional transfers in response to the severe drought 
conditions that developed in 2016:  
Two years ago (in 2016), at the beginning of PSNP 4, due to the existence of a big 
drought – when grazing lands dried up, livestock died, and even people themselves 
were exposed to death – the PSNP budget shifted to respond to the situation. In this 
regard, PSNP transfers were given freely to PSNP beneficiaries with no requirement of 
performing public works. [AFA-RFSTF] 
Beyond planning processes, officials also shared their views on coordinating implementation 
where both PSNP and HFA support is delivered. Regional officials referred to efforts to coordinate 
in areas such as targeting, aligning transfer values, and reporting mechanisms: 
We are developing one master list of clients, master list A for PSNP clients and master 
list B for humanitarian beneficiaries, to avoid overlap and duplication. [ORO-RFSTF] 
R2: The operational linkages are manifest with the support of administration budget. 
Whenever relief is delivered from the Federal Government, the administrative budget is 
always covered from the regional management budget for food security (PSNP). 
R3: Since HFA doesn’t have technical capacity, the safety net accountant and 
coordinator are assisting them to do their transfer by PASS (software, used for PSNP 
systems). In this way, the two institutions are supporting each other. [AMH-RFSTF] 
Both PSNP contingency plans and HFA are delivered through one delivery mechanism 
using PASS software. Currently, the extended support of the 11 percent contingency 
budget is fully handled by the Regional Early Warning and Disaster Management 
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Bureau. We support them in data assessment when the federal Disaster Response 
Management-Agriculture Task Force conducts a study. [AMH-RTRMTC] 
There is an operational linkage between PSNP and humanitarian assistance in all 
structures, from the regional to woreda and kebele levels. First, the beneficiary lists are 
identified differently for PSNP and for emergency/humanitarian assistance. As we are 
working in a coordinated manner, care is taken place to avoid duplications. [AFA-
RFSTF] 
Woreda and kebele perspectives support the outlook of regional officials that there is 
considerable coordination of PSNP and HFA implementation. Woreda and kebele FSTF structures 
cover operations for both PSNP and humanitarian responses in most places, even if targeting 
mechanisms and payments are different between the two. As the quotes above highlight, years of 
PSNP implementation have contributed to building an infrastructure for delivery that is also useful 
for implementing HFA. Regional officials in Oromia pointed to numerous challenges for HFA 
distribution, which PSNP systems and structures were able to address: 
Among the challenges for delivering HFA are a lack of experience in the management 
of cash transfers [and] the absence of administration costs for the allocated HFA 
(transfer) resources … Coordination and logistics problems at the woreda level are 
many. [ORO-RFSTF] 
Somali Region has gone further than most regions in integrating PSNP and HFA delivery 
systems. According to the Somali RFSTF, a single system has been developed to align delivery of 
assistance through the two channels. This unified system incorporates harmonization of planning, 
joint committee structures at different levels, aligning the timing as well as the value of transfers, 
the use of PASS, and issuing of client cards. Officials explained that, to manage the two channels 
of support (PSNP and HFA), they used HFA to increase the caseload and extend the period of 
public works payments from six months to cover the entire year. Further, while the funding is from 
different sources, the same principles used for PSNP targeting are applied and the same 
committee targets PSNP and HFA beneficiaries.  
In Afar, officials explained that PSNP and HFA beneficiaries were different as were the 
distribution periods of the two programs, which reduced the challenge of simultaneously managing 
the two channels of support. In the past, PSNP and HFA transfers in Afar were mixed together 
(which was possible given that they are both provided in food in Afar, whereas in Somali region 
PSNP transfers are made in cash in some places). However, in response to the 2016 drought, 
PSNP and HFA support was kept separate, and different populations were targeted. Whereas 
PSNP beneficiaries were selected using the program’s targeting procedures, joint annual 
assessments conducted with UN agencies and NGOs were used to determine levels of 
humanitarian need.  
Overall, the extensive investment over the years in establishing and building the PSNP 
institutional architecture from federal down to local levels has had clear payoffs for the relative 
ease and timeliness of channeling humanitarian funds to those most in need.  
5. TARGETING 
Our discussion of processes above identified several areas of harmonization and operational 
linkages between the PSNP and regional/woreda structures covering humanitarian assistance. 
These include proactive support for aligning targeting across sectors. So, for instance in Tigray, 
while “PSNP has its own targeting mechanism and HFA also has its own mechanism”, the two 
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processes are harmonized so that “HFA beneficiaries were those seasonally affected by drought 
and PSNP was for chronically food insecure.” [TIG-SAE-KFSTF]  
In principle, this harmonization could take three non-mutually exclusive forms, using HFA to: 
(a) provide additional support to existing PSNP clients; (b) provide support to households that 
should have been included in PSNP but were not because of budget constraints; (c) including 
households affected by shocks but who were not considered eligible for PSNP. Most respondents 
in our qualitative surveys indicated that non-PSNP households were prioritized in HFA targeting 
processes. However, there are variations across and within regions. In Tigray, HFA was only 
provided to non-PSNP households, so there was no overlap. As reported by a woreda official in 
Loko Abaya, SNNP, “families suffering from entrenched chronic food shortage are covered under 
PSNP, while those facing seasonal food shortage are covered in HFA.” Our qualitative data 
suggest that in woredas where PSNP is operational, while PSNP households are also eligible for 
HFA, non-PSNP households are prioritized in HFA targeting processes.  
In HFA we look for those suffering the impacts of drought, internally displaced due to 
conflict, diseases, or any other risk. While PSNP goes to those who were critically food 
insecure for more than three years, HFA and contingency resources address those 
who normally have resources but have transitory needs due to shocks. [SOM-GUR-
WTRMTC] 
Some woredas saw HFA as an opportunity to increase coverage of needy households within 
communities:  
The additional food aid helped us to increase our beneficiary number to cover those 
who are in need but were excluded because of the fixed quota system. [AFA-ELI-
WFSTF]  
We have considered it as an opportunity rather than a challenge, because many of the 
people in our woreda were not targeted by PSNP. [AFA-ABA-WFSTF] 
The question as to whether PSNP households are eligible for HFA transfers was also included 
in the quantitative community surveys. About 26 percent of the kebele informants reported that 
PSNP households are eligible to receive HFA with limited variation across the six regions (from 
21 percent in Tigray to 31 percent in Afar). These surveys also included a series of "forced choice" 
questions about kebele officials' attitudes toward targeting.12 Table 5.1 summarizes the responses 
given by the kebele officials, contrasting views regarding PSNP and HFA targeting.13  
It is clear from these data that the attitudes of those with decision making power at the local 
level are pro-poor – responses to questions 1 and 5 indicated across both programs that fairness 
corresponds to provision of program transfers and benefits to poor households. Despite this, there 
is a noticeable difference in the strength of perceptions across the two programs, with fewer 
officials reporting that poverty is the main criteria of fairness for the HFA program. This may reflect 
the fact that the effects of the drought hit as many non-poor households as it did poor households.  
 
12 In a forced choice question, the respondent is given two or more alternatives and asked to choose which statement they agree with 
most. 
13 The questions about PSNP were asked in 2016 in PSNP baseline survey while the questions about HFA were asked in 2018 in the 
PSNP midline survey. 
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Table 5.1: Kebele officials' attitudes toward targeting 






1 a) Fairness requires that everyone in this kebele have access to program benefits. 9.5 12.0 
b) Fairness requires that only the poorest households in this kebele have access to 
program benefits. 
90.5 88.0 
2 a) We know who is poor in this locality. 87.3 80.4 
b) It is difficult to distinguish between poor and less poor households in this locality. 12.7 19.6 
3 a) There will be tension in this locality if program payments only go to some households. 50.6 58.9 
b) People in this locality agree that program payments should only go to some 
households, not all. 
49.4 41.1 
4 a) Because we know who is poor in this locality, we can target program transfers to 
those who need them most. 
83.5 62.7 
b) Differences between households are so small that the only fair way to allocate 
program transfers is to give them to many households. 
16.5 37.3 
5 a) It is only fair that local leaders in this locality should receive program transfers if they 
help with program implementation 
12.7 20.9 
b) It is only fair that program transfers should only go to poor households. 87.3 79.1 
Note: N=158 kebeles. Data on targeting attitudes is missing for 8 kebeles. 
It is also interesting that the responses to question 2 suggest that, with regard to HFA targeting, 
it is more difficult for kebele level officials to distinguish between the poor and less poor, as 
compared to PSNP targeting. This may reflect the lack of clarity in the official eligibility criteria for 
HFA beneficiaries, as is clear from our qualitative data reported above. It also may be due to the 
bi-annual needs assessment – HFA may focus more on the transiently poor instead of the 
chronically poor households targeted by PSNP (World Bank 2020).  
Furthermore, the responses to forced choice question 4 suggests that identifying the poor for 
targeting purposes is significantly more difficult for HFA transfers – only 63 percent of respondents 
said they could identity the poor for targeting HFA, compared to 84 percent for PSNP targeting. 
This fuzziness in eligibility for HFA transfers is further illustrated in the response to question 3, 
where expectation of tension within the community due to narrow targeting (option 3a) is higher for 
HFA transfers.  
Table 5.2: Percent of households receiving support from Humanitarian Food Assistance 
and Productive Safety Net Programme, by region 
Region N HFA PSNP Neither 
Afar 593 5.4 56.9 37.7 
Amhara 1,241 7.8 46.4 45.8 
Oromia 787 7.8 46.0 46.2 
SNNP 792 9.1 38.1 52.9 
Somali 297 0.4 45.7 53.8 
Tigray 1,296 6.3 45.2 48.5 
All regions 5,006 6.9 45.9 47.2 
Note: N = Number of households. Percentages are based on survey weights described in the text. 
Mindful of these results, we turn to examine our quantitative household data, focusing on the 
year 2017 and applying the sampling weights described earlier. Table 5.2 shows the share of 
households benefitting from each program. In terms of coverage, PSNP is considerably more 
important than HFA in these localities. About 46 percent of households in these communities 
benefitted from the PSNP and about 7 percent from HFA (with the Somali region being an outlier). 
The remaining 47 percent of households did not receive support from either program in 2017. Only 
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50 households reported receiving both PSNP and HFA benefits, indicating that HFA was not used 
to provide additional support to existing PSNP clients. However, we acknowledge that it may be 
difficult for PSNP households to recognize the correct source of additional support. Therefore, and 
to avoid double counting, we have considered these 50 households as PSNP beneficiaries only in 
our analyses. 
We study targeting performance by assessing how the likelihood of selection into both programs 
varies by household asset levels. Following previous targeting analyses in Ethiopia (Berhane et al. 
2013, Berhane et al. 2016a), our primary measure of wealth is households' livestock holdings. 
Livestock is a typical measure of wealth in rural Ethiopia; 86 percent of the households in our 
sample own livestock. It has also typically been the main wealth indicator used in the PSNP to 
target households at the local level (Coll-Black et al. 2012). We measure livestock holdings in 
terms of tropical livestock units (TLU).14 Table 5.3 shows TLU distribution by region. The average 
household in our sample owns 3.7 TLUs (median 2.3 TLU) with relatively small variation across the 
regions, apart from Afar where average TLU holdings are considerably larger. We then categorize 
households into quintiles based on their TLU holdings.15 Households in the bottom quintile own 
0.01 TLUs (equivalent of 1 chicken) on average, while households in the top quintile own more 
than 10 TLUs on average. There is an obvious difference in the average TLU between the lowland 
agro-pastoralist areas and highland areas, with households in Afar and Somali regions having 
significantly more livestock than households in the highland regions of Amhara, Oromia, SNNP, 
and Tigray. 
Table 5.3: Mean household livestock holdings by region and by TLU quintile, in Tropical 
Livestock Units (TLU) 
 All Afar Amhara Oromia SNNP Somali Tigray 
Mean 3.7 8.8 3.2 3.1 2.2 3.7 3.2 
Median 2.3 4.1 2.9 2.0 1.3 2.3 2.7 
mean by TLU quintile: 
Poorest 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 
2nd quintile 1.2 1.8 1.4 1.4 0.4 1.0 0.9 
Middle 2.7 4.2 2.8 2.7 1.6 2.4 2.5 
4th quintile 4.9 9.3 4.4 4.9 3.0 4.6 4.5 
Richest 10.7 28.2 7.3 11.8 7.0 10.6 7.7 
Note: Survey-weighted estimates. N = 5,006 households. 
Next, we compare the likelihood of receiving HFA across TLU quintiles.16 Figure 5.1 shows the 
share of households benefitting from each program by TLU quintile. These results confirm the 
earlier finding that PSNP targeting is generally pro-poor (Coll-Black et al. 2012, World Bank 2020): 
across all regions in our sample – households in the poorest two quintiles are nearly three times 
more likely to be selected into the program than households in the richest quintile. By contrast, the 
likelihood of selection into HFA increases steadily as we move from the poorest to the richer 
quintiles. Households in the richest quintile are nearly two times more likely to be selected to 
receive HFA than households in the bottom two quintiles. In the Annexes, we show that these 
 
14 The tropical livestock unit (TLU) method is a means of measuring diverse livestock holdings literally by adding together cows, sheep, 
and other animals. The standard measure of one TLU is an adult bull or cow with a body weight of 250 kg (Jahnke 1982). TLU are 
expressed as ratios to this, the ratios being based on metabolic weights. So, for example, six sheep have the same energy 
requirements as one adult bull or cow, so six sheep are one TLU or, alternatively, one sheep = 0.167 TLU. 
15 We use zone-specific TLU quintile ranges; each household's standing in a TLU quintile is based on its relative ranking within a zone. 
16 Livelihoods in our sample can vary enormously both across and within regions. For example, in SNNP, HFA is delivered in the 
highland areas where crop-agriculture is the main livelihood, but also in the lowland areas of the region where the dominant livelihoods 
are pastoralism and agro-pastoralism. This within-region heterogeneity complicates the targeting analysis. For example, if HFA is more 
common in pastoralist areas where livestock holdings are typically larger, then a regional targeting analysis would indicate that 
humanitarian support is targeted towards wealthier households. To address this issue, we use zone-specific TLU quintile ranges; each 
household's standing in the quintile is based on its relative ranking within a sub-regional zone and not within a region as a whole. 
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findings are robust to using alternative asset measures – TLU per capita (Annex Figure 1); lagged 
TLU levels17 (Annex Figure 2); and ownership of consumer durables (Annex Figure 3)18. 
Figure 5.1: Percent of households receiving Humanitarian Food Assistance and benefitting 
from the Productive Safety Net Programme in 2017, by Tropical Livestock Unit quintile 
 
Note: The topmost number is the percent of households in quintile receiving HFA, while the number below is the percent of households 
selected into PSNP. N = 5,006 households. 
We explore these selection patterns further by comparing selected household characteristics 
between HFA and PSNP households. We estimate a multinomial logit regression where the 
dependent variable (𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) equals zero if the household did not benefit from either program in 2017, 
one if the household benefitted from the PSNP, and two if the household benefitted from HFA. 
Choosing non-beneficiaries as the reference category (𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=0), we estimate: 
(1) 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 �𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=𝑘𝑘𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=0� = 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
′ 𝛾𝛾 + 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,  
where k=1 if the household benefits from PSNP, and k=2 if it benefits from HFA. The unit of 
analysis is household i located in region r. Vector X captures various household characteristics that 
we hypothesize to be associated with selection into PSNP or HFA. These include characteristics of 
the household head (sex, age, and level of schooling), household asset levels (TLU, land size, and 
dwelling characteristics), household’s duration of residence in the kebele, and whether or not the 
household head holds an official position in the kebele. We also consider recent self-reported 
drought shocks as a predictor of program selection. The term R in the equation contains a set of 
binary indicator variables for each administrative region. We estimate this equation using a 
weighted multinomial logit model where the weights are based on the survey correction weights 
described earlier. Standard errors are clustered at the woreda level. We express the coefficients as 
relative risk ratios. In our setup, the estimated relative risk ratios quantify the probability of being 
selected for PSNP (or HFA) relative to the probability of not being selected to either program per 
 
17 This is based on retrospective questions about livestock owned one year before the interview. 
18 This is based on a wealth index based on a principal components analysis of ownership of 23 different durable assets. 
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unit increase in a given independent variable (i.e., variable in vector X). A relative risk ratio greater 
than 1 indicates an increased probability of being selected into PSNP (or HFA), and vice versa. 
Table 5.4 lists the variables used in the regression model with corresponding summary 
statistics. Across many of indicators, HFA beneficiaries are more similar to non-beneficiaries than 
to PSNP beneficiaries. In other words, compared to PSNP beneficiaries, HFA households are 
better off, more likely to be male-headed, and better educated. 
Table 5.4: Characteristics of Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) and Humanitarian 
Food Assistance households in PSNP woredas 
 (1) (2) (3) t-test t-test t-test 
 
Non-Bene-
ficiary PSNP HFA p-value p-value p-value 
Variable Mean/SE Mean/SE Mean/SE (1)-(2) (1)-(3) (2)-(3) 
Head’s schooling, years 1.807 1.144 1.904 0.000*** 0.720 0.002***  
[0.162] [0.114] [0.270] 
   
Head's age head, years 46.182 47.631 46.765 0.025** 0.605 0.434  
[0.584] [0.611] [1.188] 
   
Female head, 0/1 0.191 0.355 0.188 0.000*** 0.913 0.000***  
[0.012] [0.016] [0.030] 
   
Livestock owned by household, TLU 4.311 3.037 3.970 0.001*** 0.424 0.089*  
[0.379] [0.533] [0.379] 
   
Land size owned, in hectares 0.949 0.759 0.988 0.000*** 0.734 0.033**  
[0.076] [0.064] [0.114] 
   
Dwelling has metal roof, 0/1 0.512 0.343 0.480 0.000*** 0.532 0.003***  
[0.038] [0.038] [0.055] 
   
Dwelling in bad or very poor condition, 0/1 0.193 0.317 0.255 0.000*** 0.043** 0.077*  
[0.016] [0.022] [0.034] 
   
Head holds official position, 0/1 0.107 0.070 0.111 0.000*** 0.821 0.028**  
[0.010] [0.008] [0.020] 
   
Household resident for 5 years or less, 0/1 0.258 0.275 0.287 0.356 0.354 0.660  
[0.018] [0.022] [0.027] 
   
Household size 5.230 4.728 5.357 0.000*** 0.406 0.000***  
[0.087] [0.103] [0.168] 
   
Household reported drought in 2016-17 0.324 0.358 0.494 0.207 0.000*** 0.002***  
[0.031] [0.037] [0.047] 
   
Afar region 0.094 0.145 0.108 0.034** 0.758 0.362  
[0.038] [0.055] [0.056] 
   
Amhara region 0.241 0.255 0.254 0.550 0.831 0.978  
[0.059] [0.060] [0.078] 
   
Oromia region 0.154 0.152 0.204 0.959 0.399 0.253  
[0.051] [0.050] [0.076] 
   
SNNP region 0.177 0.129 0.206 0.151 0.632 0.122  
[0.056] [0.045] [0.076] 
   
Somali region 0.068 0.061 0.003 0.494 0.083* 0.083*  
[0.038] [0.034] [0.003] 
   
Tigray region 0.267 0.258 0.225 0.721 0.463 0.467  
[0.061] [0.060] [0.070] 
   
N 2,315 2,294 397 
   
Clusters 56 55 48 
   
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the woreda level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent critical level. 
Estimates are based on survey weights. TLU = Tropical Livestock Unit 
Table 5.5 shows the results of the multinomial logit estimation. The estimated relative risk ratios 
further confirm the finding that HFA is used to extend the safety net in PSNP localities to those who 
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are otherwise not included. Given that non-PSNP beneficiaries are often marginally better off, but 
also still prone to shocks, it makes sense that the better-off are targeted for HFA to cover their 
acute needs. First, even after controlling for differences in basic household characteristics, 
households with larger livestock holdings are less likely to be selected into PSNP. A unit increase 
in household’s TLU holdings is associated with a lower probability of being selected into PSNP (as 
indicated by the statistically significant coefficient of 0.93). Second, relative to non-beneficiary 
households, female headed households are considerably more likely to be selected into PSNP, 
while the corresponding estimate for HFA is not statistically significant. Third, households with 
corrugated metal roofs are less likely to get selected into PSNP, but roofing material does not 
seem to play a role in selection into HFA. Poor dwelling condition is also correlated with selection 
into both programs (compared to not being selected for either program). Fourth, recently arrived 
households are more likely to be selected into PSNP. The relative risk ratio for recently arrived 
households in the case of HFA is also greater than one, but not statistically significant. Fifth, 
holding an official position in the kebele does not seem to be correlated with selection into PSNP or 
HFA. Finally, households reporting to have suffered from a drought are more than two times more 
likely to be selected into HFA (as opposed to not being selected into either program). The same 
estimate is not statistically significant in the case of PSNP, suggesting that a household’s exposure 
to recent localized droughts does not alter probabilities for selection into PSNP.  
Table 5.5: Relative risk ratios of selection into Productive Safety Net Programme and 
Humanitarian Food Assistance programs, multinomial logit model 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Non-beneficiary PSNP beneficiary HFA beneficiary 
Head's schooling, years base 0.954*** 1.016 
  (0.014) (0.032) 
Head's age head, years base 1.006** 1.004 
  (0.003) (0.005) 
Female head, 0/1 base 1.862*** 1.028 
  (0.187) (0.166) 
Livestock owned by household, TLU base 0.934** 0.978 
  (0.027) (0.018) 
(ln) land holdings in ha base 0.959 1.074 
  (0.033) (0.063) 
Dwelling has a metal roof, 0/1 base 0.544*** 0.913 
  (0.057) (0.212) 
Dwelling is in bad or very poor condition, 0/1 base 1.230* 1.256* 
  (0.150) (0.168) 
Head holds official position, 0/1 base 0.899 1.036 
  (0.098) (0.175) 
Household resident for 5 years or less, 0/1 base 1.279*** 1.137 
  (0.121) (0.171) 
Household size base 1.004 1.021 
  (0.020) (0.026) 
Household reported a drought in 2016-17, 0/1 base 1.124 2.058*** 
  (0.122) (0.340) 
Binary variables for each region?  Yes  
Observations  5,006  
Notes: Multinomial logit model. Coefficients are relative risk ratios. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the woreda level. 
Asterisks indicate the following: *** p <0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. TLU = Tropical Livestock Unit. 0/1=binary variable. Estimates are based 
on survey weights. 
In summary, HFA was used to provide support to non-PSNP households that have experienced 
a drought shock. Because PSNP is well-targeted – PSNP beneficiaries are, on average, poorer (as 
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measured by TLUs), with less educated and older heads, are more likely to be female headed, and 
have poorer quality housing – and because HFA was not used to provide additional assistance to 
existing PSNP households, this meant that HFA went to households that were relatively better off 
than the average PSNP beneficiary.  
6. TRANSFERS – PREFERENCES AND EQUIVALENCE 
VALUES 
The ‘attitudes to targeting’ data suggest that the ability to distinguish who is eligible for HFA 
transfers is more difficult than determining eligibility for PSNP. We also see in these data some 
expectation that HFA transfers should be more widely available than PSNP transfers. It is possible 
that this leads local level officials to dilute HFA payments across more households than officially 
allocated. Therefore, in this section we look at transfer preferences and the level of transfer values 
across PSNP and HFA payments. 
Our qualitative work revealed that there has been an effort to harmonize the value/wage rate of 
the transfer across PSNP and HFA. That is, to deal with the problem that in some places HFA 
transfers are provided that are higher in value than PSNP payments, the PSNP payments are 
increased temporarily to ensure equivalence across payment types. However, this harmonization is 
not applied in all woredas. Regional and woreda-level officials were asked whether the extra food 
aid caused any challenges (or opportunities) for PSNP implementation. The main challenges that 
were raised relate to non-equivalence in the food value of the two transfers; perceived inequality in 
the number of family members included in the calculation of the transfer amount; and the 
difference in the duration of receipt of the transfers.  
The challenge is that the food for HFA includes pulses and oils, and this creates some 
jealousy among PSNP beneficiaries. They say: ‘we are poor, but we did not get the 
pulses and oils’. [TIG-RFSTF]  
Under HFA, the whole family is targeted, but PSNP transfers are limited to five 
members. It causes complaints: when some PSNP beneficiaries see their neighbors 
getting full transfers, they complain. [SOM-SHI-WFSTF] 
We [the region] are concerned that the higher wage rate and household cap for food 
aid will cause a dependency syndrome by discouraging people from becoming self-
reliant through the support of PSNP development concept. [AMH-RFSFT]  
Woreda officials indicated that they have tried to deal with complaints from PSNP beneficiaries 
towards the HFA provision.  
We have been trying to help the PSNP clients to understand the difference, as HFA is 
a temporary intervention as opposed to PSNP. Besides, HFA does not have other 
program components like those included in the PSNP. [AMH-DESS-WFSTF] 
Regional, woreda and kebele officials gave mixed views on whether households preferred to 
receive their support via HFA or PSNP. PSNP was seen to offer regular support over a longer 
period. However, the value of the in-kind payments received under HFA is higher than those 
received from PSNP, particularly after pulses were dropped from the PSNP payment package.  
They prefer HFA, because the food transfer norm for PSNP has been reduced -- the 
cash does not buy the same amount of grain. But for HFA, the food package includes 
pulses and oil. [TIG-RTMTRC] 
Generally, the community prefers to have transfers from PSNP. We think it is because 
PSNP is for 6 months while HFA is mostly for 1 to 3 months. [ORO-Kuy-WFSTF] 
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A regional official from Amhara described the tensions around preferences for HFA versus 
PSNP:  
Some people at the community level prefer transfers through HFA. This is because of 
two reasons. If the transfer is in food, it has a full package (oil, cereals and pulses) and 
fulfils the dietary requirement of the family. And, if the transfer is in cash, it exceeds the 
PSNP transfer by 10 birr per person (43 birr vs 33 birr). For these reasons, people 
prefer HFA. In contrast, PSNP is preferred by the administration as well as many other 
community members. This is because, unlike the HFA transfer, PSNP has a 
management budget which supports the delivery expenses of the transfer. Some in the 
community prefer PSNP because it is predictable and, so, people can plan ahead. 
[AMH-RTMTRC] 
A woreda FSTF official explained the confusion felt by community members:  
There is confusion about the difference between the transfers given through PSNP and 
HFA. PSNP clients look at the transfer payment given in food items as a privilege. 
There are some PSNP clients who prefer HFA more than PSNP support. This is 
probably because of the recent deductions of transfer payments and skyrocketing food 
grain prices that have discouraged PSNP clients – as the transfer payment does not 
purchase grains equivalent to the amount of grains given by HFA. [AMH-DESS-
WFSTF]  
In Afar, where both transfers are made in food, the preferences are not as straightforward.  
As you know, PSNP is implemented from January to June and HFA is implemented 
based on needs assessments. In terms of predictability, the community prefers PSNP 
because the community is aware of the timing of PSNP transfers; but, in terms of 
volume and quality, they prefer HFA, because they get additional food items included, 
like oil and pulses. [AFA-RTRMTC] 
In summary, the qualitative data show mixed views about the equivalence and preferences 
between PSNP and HFA payments. The differences in payment modalities – while HFA payments 
come mainly in the form of food, PSNP has largely shifted to cash transfers – makes it difficult for 
administrators and beneficiaries to compare payment levels between the two programs. We also 
know from our previous work that PSNP beneficiaries overwhelmingly prefer food payments, 
mainly because food payments maintain their value in the context of high food inflation (Hirvonen 
and Hoddinott 2021). This then can explain the preference toward HFA payments that are mostly 
in food, especially in areas where PSNP payments come in the form of cash. There could also be 
differences between the stated entitlements and the transfers actually received by the households. 
For example, in reality, the food payment packages under PSNP rarely included pulses during the 
study period. 
These considerations motivate us to use our quantitative data and a regression approach to 
assess the equivalence of transfer values across HFA and PSNP recipients. To do so, we model 
(log) per capita payment received in month m by household i residing in woreda w on a binary 
variable obtaining a value of 1 if the payment came through the PSNP and zero if HFA: 
(2) 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑁𝑁𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′ 𝛾𝛾 + 𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′ 𝛿𝛿 + 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 
 
where X and H are vectors capturing time-varying and time-invariant variables, respectively, that 
are likely to affect payment levels. For example, previous work on PSNP has noted that, because 
of the persistent high food inflation in the country, the value of cash payments are typically of 
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considerably lower than the value of food payments (Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux 2010, 
Hirvonen and Hoddinott 2021). To account for this and the fact that cash payments are more 
common in the PSNP than in the HFA, we control for the difference in the payment value through a 
binary variable obtaining value 1 if the payment was in cash and zero if it was in food. Moreover, 
PSNP payments are characterized by delays that result in situations where several months of 
payments come at once. To control for such lumpiness of PSNP payments, we include a variable 
capturing the number of payments the household has received in the past five months.  
Time-invariant variables include a set of binary variables for different numbers of household 
members that we expect to influence payment levels – even after expressing payments in per 
capita terms. We also include a binary variable capturing female-headed households to control for 
possible differences in payments received by male and female-headed households. The equation 
also includes woreda (𝜇𝜇) and month (𝜃𝜃) fixed effects. The former controls for all observed and 
unobserved time-invariant characteristics fixed to the woreda (e.g., administrative capacity, 
infrastructure), while the latter controls for macro shocks and seasonal changes occurring in a 
given month and affecting all households. The last term in the equation (𝜀𝜀) is the error term. As 
before, we cluster our standard errors at the woreda level.  
We restrict the data to months in which a payment occurred. Consequently, our regression 
model attempts to answers the following question: “What is the difference in the transferred 
amount when two similar households residing in the same woreda receive a payment in the same 
month with only difference being the source of the payment (PSNP or HFA)”. The coefficient 𝛽𝛽 
quantifies this estimated difference in payment levels between PSNP and HFA. A positive and 
statistically significant coefficient indicates that PSNP payments are larger than HFA payments, 
while the opposite is true if 𝛽𝛽 is negative and significant.  
Table 6.1 provides the summary statistics for the variables used in the regression analysis, by 
program type. The unconditional differences in payment levels are not statistically different from 
zero, irrespective if we use raw or logged payments. As noted above, cash payments are more 
common under PSNP than they are under HFA. The average beneficiary household received 2.3 
payments in the previous 5 months, on average. The difference between PSNP and HFA 
households is not statistically different from zero. We also see that female-headed households are 
more likely to receive PSNP payments than HFA households, as do smaller households.  
Table 6.1: Summary statistics of main variables used in payment analysis, by program type 
 (1) (2) t-test  
HFA PSNP p-value 
Variable Mean/[SE] Mean/[SE] (1)-(2) 
Per capita payment in birr 171.786 180.346 0.510  
[13.809] [6.695] 
 
(log) Per capita payment in birr 4.836 4.982 0.134  
[0.100] [0.036] 
 
Cash payment 0.165 0.667 0.000***  
[0.028] [0.046] 
 
Number of payments in the last 5 months 2.294 2.325 0.863  
[0.162] [0.121] 
 
Female headed household 0.220 0.361 0.000***  
[0.029] [0.013] 
 
Household size 5.210 4.637 0.004*** 
 [0.169] [0.127]  
Number of observations: 1,480 11,645 
 
Woredas: 51 55 
 
Note: The value displayed for t-tests are p-values. Standard errors (SE) are clustered at woreda level. ***, **, and * indicate significance 
at the 1, 5, and 10 percent critical levels. 
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Table 6.2 provides the regression estimates. The unconditional regression coefficient reported 
in column 1 tells us that PSNP payments are, on average, 25 percent larger than HFA payments. 
Once we control for payment modality that differs considerably between the two programs (see 
Table 6.1), the average estimated difference increases to 38 percent (column 2).19 The coefficient 
decreases slightly when we add to the regression model further controls capturing payment 
lumpiness (i.e., the number of payments the household had received over the past five months) 
and household demographics (column 3). Column 4 reports our preferred estimates based on 
equation 2. Controlling for payment modality and lumpiness, head's sex and household size as 
well as calendar month and woreda fixed effects, we estimate that payments through PSNP are, 
on average, 28 percent higher than those through HFA. These results are robust to replacing 
calendar month fixed effects with calendar month times region fixed effects (Column 1 in Annex 
Table 2) as well as replacing woreda fixed effects with kebele fixed effects (Column 2 in Annex 
Table 2). They are also robust to restricting the data to the last six months of the study period (i.e., 
January to June 2018) (Column 2 in Annex Table 2), to address concerns related to respondents 
having difficulties in accurately recalling transfers that occurred in the more distant past. 
Table 6.2: Adjusted associations between (log) per capita payment levels and program type 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Payment to a PSNP household 0.245*** 0.383*** 0.327*** 0.276*** 
 (0.085) (0.085) (0.084) (0.086) 
Cash payment  -0.289*** -0.320*** -0.174*** 
  (0.070) (0.058) (0.064) 
Number of payments in the last 5 months   -0.048*** -0.025** 
   (0.012) (0.009) 
Female headed household   -0.041 -0.046 
   (0.035) (0.029) 
Household size   -0.130*** -0.128*** 
   (0.010) (0.009) 
Calendar month fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Woreda fixed effects? No No No Yes 
Observations 13,125 13,125 13,125 13,125 
R2 0.019 0.058 0.238 0.219 
Note: Ordinary Least Square method. Dependent variable is (log) per capita payment level (in birr). Unit of observation is household-
calendar month. Standard errors clustered at the woreda level and reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 
5, and 10 percent critical levels. 
These results are surprising given the generally held assumption and qualitative findings that 
indicate that HFA is a more valuable transfer. One way to explain this is that the differences in 
payment modalities between the two programs coupled with relatively high food inflation makes it 
difficult for administrators and beneficiaries to compare the actual payment levels between PSNP 
and HFA. Furthermore, it is possible, even likely, that the pressure of local demand on local 
officials in the context of an acute and unanticipated shock may lead them to distribute the total 
HFA resources more widely than the officially prescribed transfer amount. In other words, local 
officials dilute the total amount of transfer across more households.  
Coefficients on the control variables reported in Column 4 of Table 6.2 indicate that cash 
payments are about 17 percent lower in value than food payments, thus confirming our previous 
research (Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux 2010, Hirvonen and Hoddinott 2021). Households who 
have received more payments in the last five months receive smaller payments. This finding 
 
19 This increase in the estimate is fully in line with our earlier finding that, due to high food inflation, cash transfers are less valuable than 
food transfers (Hirvonen and Hoddinott 2021). Since PSNP transfers are made mainly in the form of cash and the HFA mainly in the 
form of food, the estimated difference in the value of PSNP and HFA payment widens further once we control for the payment modality 
of the transfer. 
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suggests delays in payments resulting in payment lumpiness, a finding that also corresponds to 
our previous work (Berhane et al. 2015). We also see that larger households are receiving smaller 
per capita payments than are smaller households. We also explored whether the difference 
between PSNP and HFA payments varies by household size, but our various interaction models 
did not provide support for this hypothesis (see Annex Table 3). 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
Provision for basic needs in the wake of sudden and unanticipated shocks traditionally sits within 
the remit of humanitarian response and is typically provided as short-term (often one-off) support. 
Social protection, on the other hand, is provided as a regular transfer that allows people to cope 
with and overcome the more predictable risks to their livelihoods. Ideally, a continuum of support 
and response would be offered to help households manage risk and uncertainty across a range of 
circumstances and contexts. Innovative programming in recent years has enabled social protection 
in different contexts to scale-up assistance in response to large covariate shocks, facilitated by 
targeting systems and contingency funding that provides programs with the ability to respond more 
quickly to acute needs in a crisis than conventional humanitarian responses. PSNP is one such 
program. 
Using data from 2017-2018, we find that in the context of a drought crisis, the institutional 
architecture and processes established by PSNP over many years provided a useful and effective 
system to also deliver humanitarian assistance. Furthermore, just because the humanitarian 
assistance was channelled through the same structures used to provide PSNP safety net support, 
this did not necessarily constrain the provision of the humanitarian assistance to the PSNP target 
group. In fact, we find that the safety net support and humanitarian support were targeted to 
households with different characteristics. PSNP – meant for the poorest and most food insecure – 
did, on average, reach those households that were characterised as poor. The humanitarian 
support, while delivered through the same system as for PSNP, did not cater for households with 
poverty-identifiers, but responded to households that had reported a shock experience in the 
preceding twelve months. This is what one would expect from humanitarian support that is 
provided in response to an acute, rather than chronic, problem. Given that non-PSNP beneficiaries 
are often marginally better off, but also still prone to shocks, it would make sense that the better-off 
are targeted for HFA to cover their acute needs. We assessed targeting accuracy at the household 
level using livestock ownership as a measure of wealth. Households in the poorest two livestock 
ownership quintiles have a higher likelihood of benefitting from PSNP than the richest quintile. In 
contrast, the likelihood of selection into HFA increases as we move to richer quintiles – this 
supports the view that HFA is used to expand the total safety net as wide as possible.  
These are promising findings as they suggest that social protection systems are able to 
effectively deliver support in response to different vulnerabilities and shocks – to both chronic 
poverty as well as to acute vulnerability. PSNP is a safety net program with long-term objectives, 
whereas HFA is designed to respond to ad hoc emergency needs. This is precisely what a shock 
responsive system should be designed to do. Of course, there is always room for improvement.  
A concern that continues to vex practitioners working to facilitate linkages across the 
humanitarian and social protection sectors relates to the non-equivalence in transfer values and 
the possible adverse effects this can have on recipient behavior in terms of double-dipping, social 
tension, or strategic movement between benefits. While the broader literature often indicates that 
humanitarian support is, on average, higher value per capita (Ghorpade and Ammar 2021, McLean 
et al. 2021), our analysis shows that, per month, the PSNP support is higher value than the HFA 
transfers. One reason for this may be due to the social pressure on local officials to distribute a 
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fixed amount of support much more widely across a drought-affected population when faced with 
sudden and acute needs. In other words, local officials dilute the support across more beneficiaries 
than was officially planned for. This supports conclusions from earlier work by the authors 
(Sabates-Wheeler et al. 2013).  
The findings from this work are specific to the combined provision of social and humanitarian 
assistance in the context of a weather-related shock, in this case a drought, where a well-
developed national social protection system exists. In a relatively stable governance setting, the 
investment in national and decentralised infrastructure for social assistance has clearly reaped 
benefits for effectively providing a continuum of response. However, ongoing conflict in Ethiopia 
and the ensuing disruption to PSNP implementation in the affected areas illustrates vividly how the 
nature of a shock will determine whether social protection and humanitarian provision can (or 
should) align and be harmonised to serve the most vulnerable. Furthermore, conflict and crises 
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Annex Table 1: Distribution of households in sampled kebeles by their own subjective 
classification on a seven-rung poverty ladder 
Poverty ladder rung % Cumulative % 
The richest in the village 0.7 0.7 
One of the richest in the village 2.1 2.8 
Better than most in the village 8.5 11.3 
Middle class 29.9 41.2 
Upper poor class 20.7 61.9 
Poor 24.1 86.0 
Among the poorest of the poorest 14.0 100.0 
Total 100.0 n/a 
Source: PSNP baseline listing data, 2016. N=59,627 households. n/a=not applicable 
Annex Table 2: Payment regressions, robustness checks 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Payment period: June 2017 to 
May 2018 
June 2017 to 
May 2018 
January 2018 to 
May 2018 
Payment to a PSNP household 0.264*** 0.273*** 0.267*** 
 (0.083) (0.063) (0.092) 
Cash payment -0.158** -0.167*** -0.221*** 
 (0.060) (0.044) (0.065) 
Number of payments in the last 5 months -0.029*** -0.022*** -0.032*** 
 (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) 
Female headed household -0.046 -0.031 -0.020 
 (0.028) (0.027) (0.029) 
Household size -0.129*** -0.125*** -0.127*** 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) 
Calendar month fixed effects? No Yes Yes 
Calendar month x region fixed effects? Yes No No 
Woreda fixed effects? Yes No Yes 
Kebele fixed effects? No Yes No 
Observations 13,125 13,125 6,932 
R2 0.231 0.212 0.232 
Note: Ordinary Least Square method. Dependent variable is (log) per capita payment level (in birr). Unit of observation is household-
calendar month. Standard errors reported in parentheses and clustered at the woreda level in columns (1) and (3) and at the kebele 




Annex Table 3: Payment regressions, household size interactions 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Payment to a PSNP household 0.379*** 0.332*** 0.330*** 
 (0.106) (0.093) (0.086) 
PSNP * Household size  -0.020   
 (0.020)   
Household size -0.111***   
 (0.021)   
PSNP * Household size is >4  -0.077  
  (0.092)  
Household size is >4  -0.335***  
  (0.094)  
PSNP * Household size is >5   -0.106 
   (0.082) 
Household size is >5   -0.302*** 
   (0.083) 
All other controls Yes Yes Yes 
Calendar month fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes 
Woreda fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 13,125 13,125 13,125 
R2 0.219 0.141 0.129 
Note: Ordinary Least Square method. Dependent variable is (log) per capita payment level (in birr). Unit of observation is household-
calendar month. Standard errors clustered at the woreda level and reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 
5, and 10 percent critical level. 
Annex Figure 1: Replicating Figure 5.1 by using Tropical Livestock Unit per capita quintiles 
 
Note: The topmost number is the percent of households in quintile receiving HFA, while the number below is the percent of households 
selected into PSNP. N = 5,006 households. 
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Annex Figure 2: Replicating Figure 5.1 by using lagged Tropical Livestock Unit quintiles 
 
Note: The topmost number is the percent of households in quintile receiving HFA, while the number below is the percent of households 
selected into PSNP. N = 5,006 households. 
Annex Figure 3: Replicating Figure 5.1 by using durable asset index quintiles 
 
Note: The topmost number is the percent of households in quintile receiving HFA, while the number below is the percent of households 
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